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Recall the adversities faced by many in the entertainment industry. 
Freddie Mercury tried to join several bands before forming Queen. 
Judy Garland signed with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer at age thirteen 
after performing with her sisters throughout her childhood. Babe 
Ruth signed his first professional baseball contract with the 
minor-league Baltimore Orioles. Those same historic adversities 
faced by these giants of the entertainment industry are being 
repeated today in a closely related field—the Esports industry. 
Esports, a form of competitive video gaming, attracts audiences 
that “rival some of the world’s great sporting events.” A thorough 
due diligence review of the industry-norm contract must be 
undertaken. Esports professionals continue to fall victim to 
handshake deals put to paper like so many entertainers before them. 
Esports organizations use heavy-handed contracts to severely limit 
professionals from exploring other options and strip them of most of 
their earnings.  
Turner “Tfue” Tenney’s lawsuit against FaZe Clan brought to the 
forefront the lack of regulation in the Esports industry and the 
question of whether gamers should be entitled to similar protections 
as actors, artists, and athletes, and other entertainers. The Talent 
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Agency Act (TAA) and the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act (MAA) 
apply different standards to the representation of artists and athletes. 
By dismantling the pros from the cons of these two Acts, legislatures 
can craft new Esports-specific legislation to protect the creative 
minds of these professionals.  
Specifically, the proposed legislation should further define 
“artist” and “other entertainment enterprises” from the TAA to 
account for the new characters in the entertainment industry, such as 
professional gamers and influencers. The legislation should also 
define “athlete” to help guide courts in determining if professional 
gamers are better labeled as an athlete, artist, or a combination of 
the two.  
This is not the first time the entertainment industry has prioritized 
agents’ financial gains over artists’ and athletes’ freedom to contract 
and livelihoods, but hopefully courts, legislatures, and lawyers can 
use the past lessons of Freddie, Judy, Babe, and the countless others 
to better protect professional gamers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Esports, a form of competitive video gaming, is a worldwide 
phenomenon projected to eclipse $1.8 billion in global revenue by 
2022.1 The immediate and continuing societal impact of video games 
cannot be overstated, but few remember the first Esports event in 
1972.2 That event featured the video game Spacewar! and offered 
only a year’s subscription to Rolling Stone as the meager grand 
prize.3 Nearly half a century later, the sixteen-year-old Kyle 
Giersdorf won $3 million in the first-ever Fortnite World Cup.4 
Giersdorf’s winnings greatly exceeded that of the victors of the 
Masters, the PGA Championship, and nearly matched the U.S. Open 
earnings.5 His win propelled the world of competitive video gaming 
into a fast-growing, international spectacle with millions of fans and 
billions of dollars up for grabs.6 Giersdorf and other Esports 
 
 1. Guide: What Are E-Sports?, BBC, https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/37773832 
[https://perma.cc/J4ET-U57Y] (Apr. 6, 2017, 2:50 PM) (“Some players might train for up to 14 hours a 
day to make sure they have extremely quick reflexes and reactions. Players might make more than 300 
‘actions’ per minute, so they have to be able to multi-task extremely well.”); see also Jurre Pannekeet, 
Global Esports Economy Will Top $1 Billion for the First Time in 2019, NEWZOO (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://newzoo.com/insights/articles/newzoo-global-esports-economy-will-top-1-billion-for-the-first-
time-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/Z6CQ-Y6P7]. 
 2. The History and Evolution of Esports, BOUNTIE GAMING (Jan. 3, 2018), 
https://bountiegaming.medium.com/the-history-and-evolution-of-esports-8ab6c1cf3257 
[https://perma.cc/834P-5E83]. 
 3. Id. (“[I]t wasn’t until 1980 whereby the first video game competition was held. The Space 
Invaders Championship had a great attendance of 10,000 participants and received widespread media 
attention since Space Invaders . . . was a household name at that point of time.”). 
 4. Patrick Smith, E-Sports Practices Get Boost with Teen’s Fortnite Win, LAW.COM: THE AM. 
LAW. (Aug. 5, 2019, 10:16 AM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2019/08/05/e-sports-practices-
get-boost-with-teens-fortnite-win/ [https://perma.cc/T7QB-W87S]. 
 5. Id.; Masters 2019: How Much the Winner of the Masters Makes, PGA (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://www.pga.com/events/masters/masters-2019-how-much-winner-masters-makes 
[https://perma.cc/H3JF-2QXJ]; James Crabtree-Hannigan, U.S. Open Prize Money: How Much Will the 
Winners Make in 2019? Purse, Breakdown for Field, SPORTING NEWS (Sept. 7, 2019), 
https://www.sportingnews.com/us/tennis/news/us-open-prize-money-2019-purse-
breakdown/eao43nwd2l551a3j5yzvdnfeq [https://perma.cc/UJ9L-LH6B]; 2019 PGA Championship: 
Purse and Winner’s Share, PGA (May 19, 2019), https://www.pga.com/events/pgachampionship/2019-
pga-championship-purse-and-winners-share/ [https://perma.cc/68MZ-67R4]. 
 6. AJ Willingham, What Is Esports? A Look at an Explosive Billion-Dollar Industry, CNN (Aug. 
27, 2018, 2:18 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/27/us/esports-what-is-video-game-professional-
league-madden-trnd/ [https://perma.cc/D64Q-2T6Z] (“Streaming services and live events have turned 
casual gamers into serious stars who can sometimes rake in seven-figure earnings and massive brand 
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participants are far from the “perpetuated stereotype of video games 
being played by overweight teenagers huddled in dark basements”—
evident by the 380 million-person global Esports audience in 2018, 
165 million of whom were dedicated viewers.7 
Nothing less than a modern gold rush, Esports’ success has led 
many to mention it alongside other more traditional sports like 
baseball, but “the comparison may not be apt.”8 The term Esports 
“has been assigned to the practice,” but whether lawmakers and 
regulators agree that the contests are indeed sports remains to be 
seen.9 “Often referred to as the ‘wild wild west,’ esports law is a 
rowdy, unrestrained, and often lawless legal landscape”10 that is 
“rapidly gaining mainstream attention.”11 
When approaching Esports, legislators and courts must be careful 
not to hinder its growth but rather take into account the unique nature 
of the industry and help Esports professionals continue to climb the 
ladder of global success.12 Video game jurisprudence will likely grow 
quickly as courts face tough decisions—such as determining whether 
“esports [are] ‘sports’ in the traditional athletic sense.”13 And one 
new lawsuit started challenging courts to answer the debate of 
 
endorsements.”). 
 7. John T. Holden et al., The Future Is Now: Esports Policy Considerations and Potential 
Litigation, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 46, 47 (2017); Pannekeet, supra note 1. 
 8. John T. Holden & Thomas A. Baker III, The Econtractor? Defining the Esports Employment 
Relationship, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 391, 391 (2019). 
 9. Holden et al., supra note 7 (“[R]egulators . . . and . . . courts need to address the normative 
question most competitive activities deal with at their nascent stage: Are esports ‘sports’ in the 
traditional athletic sense? Or are video game competitions more closely aligned with professional 
wrestling and other types of performing arts and/or skill-based entertainment?” (footnotes omitted)). 
 10. Ellen M. Zavian & Jim Schmitz, Genesis of an Industry: The Emerging Workforce and 
Regulations of Esports, 37 ACC DOCKET 24, 26 (2019) (stating that the audience has surpassed 
spectator numbers for traditional sports, like the National Football League’s 22.2 million live viewers 
versus Esports’ 143 million). 
 11. Holden et al., supra note 7, at 46. 
 12. Though the Esports industry is growing exponentially, it is still in a very vulnerable position. 
Just a single misguided law or misinformed judicial opinion could topple a movement that represents a 
source of employment for many professionals, and a form of entertainment for many more across the 
world. 
 13. Holden et al., supra note 7; Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10 (“[Video games] differ from 
traditional sports because the game publishers own their intellectual property. . . . [I]n esports, 
publishers definitely own their games and thus are in complete control of the emerging industry . . . .”). 
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“whether professional gamers are athletes, performers or something 
else” where video games, players, and money converge in a new 
market.14 
This Note explores the classification of professional gamers and 
the legal implications that result from that classification. Part I 
discusses the background surrounding Esports and introduces the 
debate of whether professional gamers are athletes, artists, or perhaps 
both. Part II provides an analysis of how governing agencies have 
applied laws differently to athletes and artists, the results of that 
bifurcated application, and how agencies have applied similar laws to 
athletes in traditional sports. Part III proposes a solution to the debate 
over the legal classification of professional gamers, modeled from the 
approach applied to traditional athletes but with a twist to account for 
the unique landscape of those working in professional gaming, which 
is a “predatory and largely unregulated industry that systematically 
exploits its talent.”15 
I. BACKGROUND 
Regardless of whether society views Esports as a hobby, an 
expensive waste of time, or an actual sport, the industry is growing 
exponentially.16 Notwithstanding any negative attitude toward video 
games, “esports will continue to grow as an industry—and a 
pastime—for the foreseeable future” due to its seemingly 
unstoppable cultural momentum.17 Young people are participating 
 
 14. Jessica Conditt, Tfue’s Lawsuit Against FaZe Has Been a Long Time Coming, ENGADGET (May 
21, 2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019/05/21/tfue-sue-faze-esports-contracts-agent-youtube-twitch-
influencer [https://perma.cc/ZNJ9-8FGU]; Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10, at 27 (“Players are as 
young as 15 years old when they enter into their first contract.”). 
 15. Hailey Konnath, Pro Gamer Slams ‘Unregulated,’ ‘Oppressive’ Esports Industry, LAW360 (May 
20, 2019, 10:28 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1161538/pro-gamer-slams-unregulated-
oppressive-esports-industry [https://perma.cc/3SYM-CEPH]. 
 16. Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10. 
 17. Willingham, supra note 6 (“Colleges have even gotten in on the action. More than 50 colleges 
have varsity eSports programs, recognized by a governing body called the National Association of 
Collegiate Esports [(NACE)]. NACE championships dole out thousands of dollars in prize money, 
which is put towards scholarships for the winners.”). 
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progressively more in high school and in collegiate Esports; in fact, 
the industry is affording a select few the option to pursue a career in 
not just a single genre but a single video game itself.18 One of the 
most popular Esports games, Overwatch, is described as “an 
intense . . . action game that emphasizes teamwork and individual 
skill. Players choose heroes with diverse and powerful abilities, then 
clash on a variety of maps.”19 Another popular game is League of 
Legends, which is a strategy role-playing game where “[t]wo teams 
of five ‘champions’ compete to take down the other team’s base.”20 
Overwatch and League of Legends are a part of one of the 
“quickest-growing segments of the entertainment industry”: 
competitive video gaming.21 
 
 18. William Stark et al., Antitrust Issues Grow Out of Esports’ Success, L.J. NEWSLS. (June 2019), 
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/2019/06/01/antitrust-issues-grow-out-of-esports-
success/?slreturn=20190828144655/ (explaining that the intellectual property rights game developers 
possess pose interesting antitrust and fair use issues that this Note will not explore). 
 19. Steve Lubetkin, Online Computer Gaming Gains Validation with $50M Esports Arena in 
Philadelphia Sports Complex, GLOBEST.COM (Mar. 26, 2019, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.globest.com/2019/03/26/online-computer-gaming-gains-validation-with-50m-esports-
arena-in-philadelphia-sports-complex/?slreturn=20190828145528/ [https://perma.cc/UWZ5-KPR6]; 
Overwatch, BLIZZARD ENT., https://playoverwatch.com/en-us/ [https://perma.cc/QJ9Q-BYSM]. A $50 
million next-generation Esports and entertainment venue will be built in the Philadelphia Sports 
Complex. Lubetkin, supra. This arena will be the largest of its kind in the Western Hemisphere 
specifically built for the Esports industry and will accommodate 3,500 guests. Id. Setting the gold 
standard for Esports, this project propels the industry into an equally exciting light as major traditional 
sports. Id. 
 20. LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, https://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/ [https://perma.cc/UUH3-HG8E]; Mike 
Snider, After a Decade, ‘League of Legends’ Remains at the Top of Its Game, USA TODAY: VIDEO 
GAMES, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/gaming/2019/10/15/online-video-game-league-legends-
turns-10-looks-future/3930899002/ [https://perma.cc/399K-5D8T] (Oct. 17, 2019, 10:35 AM) (“It is 
probably the closest thing to taking chess out of the physical environment with all these additional layers 
of critical thinking on top of it . . . .” (quoting Ann Hand, CEO and Chairman of Super League Gaming, 
a national amateur Esports organization)). 
 21. Holden et al., supra note 7, at 46 (“Esports, as the practice of competitive video gaming has been 
named, is a term that represents a variety of different game types and game titles.”); Katherine E. 
Hollist, Note, Time To Be Grown-Ups About Video Gaming: The Rising eSports Industry and the Need 
for Regulation, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 825–26 (2015). Katherine Hollist provides the following 
description of Esports: 
Put simply, “eSports” are professional video game matches where players compete 
against other players before an audience. In the past few years, eSports have emerged 
as an increasingly popular alternative to other spectator sports, particularly among 
younger viewers. Like their traditional sports counterparts, eSports players compete 
in events with a variety of styles—some compete directly against other competitors in 
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A. Investing in an Esports World 
“Professional teams and players have fueled much of esports’ 
explosive growth, supported by significant investments from 
traditional sports franchise owners . . . and increased visibility on 
traditional media outlets.”22 Scrambling to compete for the valuable 
youthful attention evidenced by rapidly rising viewership numbers, 
major professional sports leagues have poured a “significant influx of 
investment capital” into the explosive growth and commercial 
opportunity in Esports.23 
Cavs Legion, an Esports team affiliated with the Cleveland 
Cavaliers of the National Basketball Association (NBA), announced 
a plan to open “a new facility in Cleveland that will cater to players 
and fans of the fast-growing esports industry.”24 Following suit, 
 
different roles and work cooperatively to score points against other teams (like 
basketball); and still others compete by allowing each competitor to take a turn and 
then compare their ultimate times/scores (like Olympic skiing or gymnastics). 
Today’s most popular eSports events center on team-based play. In League of 
Legends, for instance, competitors face off as two teams of five. From their seats on 
stage-left or stage-right in sold-out arenas, each player selects from an 
ever-expanding set of in-game avatars, each equipped with five unique in-game 
abilities. Ten player-controlled avatars materialize in the virtual League of Legends 
arena, where they will skirmish one another, kill nonplayer minions for in-game gold 
(which they can exchange for virtual items to increase their avatar’s power), and 
ultimately fight to eliminate the opposing team by storming their opponent’s base. 
The game operates like a combination of capture the flag and chess, with the 
additional spectator appeal of the lightning-fast reflexes required to anticipate and 
avoid the maneuvers of the human-controlled enemy players. Teams face off in 
weekly match-ups during the regular season, and the teams with the best records 
continue on to the championship rounds, where they can compete for enormous 
prizes. 
Hollist, supra (footnotes omitted). 
 22. P. William Stark & Steve Walkowiak, Growing Esports to a $1.6B Industry and Corruption 
Risks, LAW.COM: TEX. LAW. (Jan. 25, 2019, 12:31 PM), 
https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2019/01/25/growing-esports-to-a-1-6b-industry-and-corruption-risks/ 
[https://perma.cc/4UNY-RFMG]. 
 23. LONN A. TROST ET AL., 5 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE 
COUNSEL § 74A:71.50, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2020); Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10. 
 24. Matthew Guarnaccia, NBA’s Cavs Roll Out Plans for Esports Facility in Cleveland, LAW360 
(July 19, 2019, 4:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1180211/nba-s-cavs-roll-out-plans-for-
esports-facility-in-cleveland [https://perma.cc/7YE3-QB6M] (“[The facility] will house a central stage 
with two stacked rows of computers on each side. Each bank of six computers will face one another, 
providing enough room for 12 competitors at a time, and will sit directly below a video display 
stretching 5 feet high and 16 feet wide.”). 
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game publishers such as Activision, Blizzard, and Riot Games, which 
produce game titles such as League of Legends, Call of Duty, 
Overwatch, and Halo have poured in investments.25 Also joining the 
fray are venture capital firms and sports celebrities.26 Dallas 
Cowboys owner, Jerry Jones, bought Complexity Gaming, a team 
that will now play in Dallas, home of Esports Stadium Arlington.27 
And Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban owns Mavs Gaming, 
which sponsors a team playing in the NBA 2K League.28 Perhaps 
most prominently, actor Will Smith is among the new investors in the 
Esports franchise Generation Gaming, which accounted for a new 
$46 million round of financing.29 
B. Esports Compared to Its Traditional Counterpart 
To many, the idea that video game players have comparable skills 
to the highest caliber of traditional professional athletes may be 
laughable, but a growing number of people realize the unique talent, 
skill, and dedication of professional gamers necessary to rise above a 
saturated market and make a name in Esports.30 Major Esports events 
attract audiences that “rival some of the world’s great sporting 
 
 25. Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10; Trent Murray, Newzoo Report Projects Global Esports 
Revenue to Reach $1.1B in 2019, ESPORTS OBSERVER (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://esportsobserver.com/newzoo-2019-report/ [https://perma.cc/85H7-BVUG]. 
 26. Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10, at 25. 
 27. Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Munck Wilson Mandala Boosts Esports Expertise in Dallas, LAW.COM: 
TEX. LAW. (May 17, 2019, 9:34 AM), https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2019/05/17/munck-wilson-
mandala-boosts-esports-expertise-in-dallas/ [https://perma.cc/52QA-MEKH]. 
 28. Id. (“Technology-focused law firm Munck Wilson Mandala has hired video gaming trademark 
lawyer D. Wade Cloud Jr. . . . . Munck Wilson isn’t the only firm in Texas beefing up its video gaming 
expertise. Late last year, Greenberg Traurig . . . launched a multi-office, cross-practice team to do work 
for esports clients . . . .”). 
 29. Eben Novy-Williams, Will Smith Takes Slice of Esports Team’s US$46 Million Financing, BNN 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/will-smith-takes-slice-of-esports-team-s-
46-million-financing-1.1245904 [https://perma.cc/DUP5-A36V] (“The coming years are going [to] see 
our company really start to crystallize its identity, not just as a brand, but also as an enterprise . . . .”). 
 30. Paul Tassi, The U.S. Now Recognizes eSports Players As Professional Athletes, FORBES (July 14, 
2013, 11:27 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2013/07/14/the-u-s-now-recognizes-esports-
players-as-professional-athletes/#3e1d81333ac9 [https://perma.cc/U3SB-6HUJ] (“I do believe the scene 
will continue to grow the way it has the past few years, and though it may never catch traditional sports, 
it’s going to be a much more accepted and less niche past time in the future.”). 
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events.”31 In many ways, “the eSports industry is similar to the 
traditional sports from which it derives its name: it is an 
entertainment industry built around competition, fan loyalty, and 
spectatorship.”32 Unlike traditional professional athletes, Esports 
gamers are not backed by unions or players associations, making 
Esports dramatically different from those traditional sports—and 
giving rise to important legal questions.33 Two California laws could 
decide an Esports gamer’s lawsuit against their employing company: 
the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agency Act (MAA)34 and the Talent 
Agencies Act (TAA).35 These two laws have the potential to reshape 
contracts in the Esports industry and tame the meteoric growth of 
Esports.36 
Under the TAA, any business or individual who acts like an agent 
must do so with an agent or agency license obtained through 
California’s Labor Commission.37 In debate, Esports lawyers always 
 
 31. TROST ET AL., supra note 23 (“Although still in a growth stage, the eSports industry has millions 
of international fans, dedicated arenas and facilities, sophisticated leagues, lucrative media rights 
agreements and other elements of traditional sports leagues.”). 
 32. Hollist, supra note 21, at 826. The combination of video game matchups, commentators, 
merchandise, and ticket venue sales make up the Esports industry. Id. 
 33. Duran Parsi, All in the Game, 42 L.A. LAW. 26, 27 (2019); Zachary Zagger, Fortnite Gamer’s 
Suit Puts Pressure on Esports Contracts, LAW360 (May 29, 2019, 10:12 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1162206/fortnite-gamer-s-suit-puts-pressure-on-esports-contracts 
[https://perma.cc/LCC9-4WXC] (noting that one legal issue asks “the question of whether gamers 
should be entitled to the same agent protections as actors and artists in the traditional entertainment 
industry”). 
 34. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18895 (West 2017). 
 35. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 (West 2013). 
 36. Turner “Tfue” Tenney’s lawsuit is “spurring conversations across influencer and esports spaces 
alike,” and if he prevails, the lawsuit will set “new, overdue standards for the esports industry overall.” 
Conditt, supra note 14; see also Konnath, supra note 15. Additionally, other players’ contracts with 
gaming companies could be called into question, potentially “shift[ing] the balance of power to the 
gamers . . . who are actually . . . driving the industry.” Complaint at 4, Tenney v. FaZe Clan Inc., No. 
19STCV17341 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 20, 2019), 2019 WL 2195136; see also Michael McCann, Inside 
the Lawsuit That Could Shake Up the Entire Esports Industry, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 30, 2019), 
https://www.si.com/more-sports/2019/05/30/turner-tenney-faze-clan-esports-lawsuit-fortnite 
[https://perma.cc/P594-8NDF]. A Tfue victory “would be a very significant piece of precedent because 
it would take a lot of existing regulations that have not applied to esports” and finally apply them to the 
industry. Zagger, supra note 33 (“Morrison said he expects to see ‘near instant changes to contracts’ and 
expects teams to start to preemptively renegotiate deals with their top gamers.” (quoting Esports 
attorney Ryan Morrison)). 
 37. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5 (West 2013) (“No person shall engage in or carry on the occupation of 
a talent agency without first procuring a license therefor from the Labor Commissioner. The license 
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highlight that teams currently in the Esports industry actually have a 
license, which is required to negotiate or bring deals to the players.38 
Further, once the agent obtains a license, they must abide by the 
regulations set forth in the statute, “which include submitting form 
contracts and fees to the state, posting bond, and prohibitions against 
discrimination and certain types of conflicts of interest.”39 Since the 
TAA’s enactment in 1978, many lawsuits have challenged its 
loopholes and flaws that undermine the California legislature’s intent 
in passing the Act: to prevent agents from taking advantage of 
artists.40 
The MAA bans sports teams from acting as representatives for 
their players and puts in place a registration system with an enhanced 
system of civil and criminal liability.41 Before acting as an athlete’s 
agent in California, any person, even a licensed California attorney, 
must register with the secretary of state and provide all information 
 
shall be posted in a conspicuous place in the office of the licensee. The license number shall be referred 
to in any advertisement for the purpose of the solicitation of talent for the talent agency. Licenses issued 
for talent agencies prior to the effective date of this chapter shall not be invalidated thereby, but 
renewals of those licenses shall be obtained in the manner prescribed by this chapter.”); McCann, supra 
note 36. 
 38. Thooorin, Esports Salon Episode 19: A Few Good Contracts (Feat. Ryan Morrison, Bryce Blum 
& Richard Lewis), YOUTUBE (June 30, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8vTgtDpcj04. 
 39. Myles L. Gutenkunst, Talent Managers Acting As Agents Revisited: An Argument for 
California’s Imperfect Talent Agencies Act, 37 HASTINGS COMMC’NS & ENT. L.J. 113, 119 (2015); CAL. 
LAB. CODE § 1700.23 (West 2013) (“Every talent agency shall submit to the Labor Commissioner a 
form or forms of contract to be utilized by such talent agency in entering into written contracts with 
artists for the employment of the services of such talent agency by such artists, and secure the approval 
of the Labor Commissioner thereof. Such approval shall not be withheld as to any proposed form of 
contract unless such proposed form of contract is unfair, unjust and oppressive to the artist. . . . There 
shall be printed on the face of the contract in prominent type the following: ‘This talent agency is 
licensed by the Labor Commissioner of the State of California.’” (emphasis added)); CAL. LAB. CODE 
§ 1700.24 (West 2013) (“Every talent agency shall file with the Labor Commissioner a schedule of fees 
to be charged and collected in the conduct of that occupation . . . .”). 
 40. See Gutenkunst, supra note 39, at 122 n.72 (discussing how clashes between talent managers and 
artists form when the manager procures employment and how the artist holds out on commission 
because the manager is not a licensed agent). 
 41. See Chiapparelli v. Henderson, No. F046363, 2005 WL 1847221, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 
2005) (deeming a contract between a mixed martial artist and his agent void because of a failure to 
follow the requirements of the MAA); Robert P. Baker, The Unintended Consequence of the 
Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act: Depriving Student Athletes of Effective Legal Representation, 12 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 267, 270 (2005); Conditt, supra note 14. 
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required under the MAA.42 The MAA provides athletes with a 
remedy by deeming noncompliant contracts “void and 
unenforceable.”43 Overall, the MAA’s main purpose “is to ensure 
that agents act in the best interests of their principals, and not for 
their own personal gain.”44 
C. Turner “Tfue” Tenney’s Gamer Agreement 
Given the rate at which Esports audiences and businesses are 
expanding, many of the contracts in place originally grew out of an 
underground gaming culture; now there is a present need for 
thorough due diligence review of gamer contracts.45 For many, 
becoming an Esports pro “marks their first ‘real’ job with a salary 
and benefits, meaning they frequently lack experience to adequately 
understand their rights and advocate for themselves.”46 These 
 
 42. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18896 (West 2017); Baker, supra note 41, at 273. 
 43. Joel M. Smith, Increasing Penalties to Catch California’s First Unscrupulous Athlete Agent, 43 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 538, 543 (2012). The MAA provides for various penalties for different violations: 
Failure to follow the Miller-Ayala Act can result in civil and criminal penalties. The 
Miller-Ayala Act allows for any person, educational institution, or league to bring a 
civil action if they are “adversely affected” by the acts of an athlete agent. Plaintiffs 
are allowed to recover the greater of fifty-thousand dollars or actual damages, 
including punitive damages, court costs, and attorney fees. Any contract that does not 
comply with the Miller-Ayala Act is “void and unenforceable.” Although the 
legislature intended civil enforcement, a violation of the Miller-Ayala Act is a 
misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of no more than fifty-thousand dollars, 
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. Also, “the court may suspend or 
revoke” an athlete agent’s privilege of being an athlete agent in California. Finally, 
the statute of limitations for a violation of the Miller-Ayala Act was one year after 
commission of the violation. 
Id. at 543–44 (footnotes omitted) (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18897.63 (West 2017)). 
 44. Marc Edelman, Disarming the Trojan Horse of the UAAA and Sparta: How America Should 
Reform Its Sports Agent Laws to Conform with True Agency Principles, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
145, 147 (2013). 
 45. TROST ET AL., supra note 23; see also Mike Ozanian et al., The World’s Most Valuable Esports 
Companies, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2018, 5:50 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2018/10/23/the-worlds-most-valuable-esports-companies-
1/#7f1fbdb16a6e [https://perma.cc/3TCW-XLCA]; Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10, at 29 (“As of 
2018, the top 12 esports companies fielded a total of 588 players on 97 teams.”). 
 46. Uriah Tagle, As North American Esports Levels Up, Its Players Lag Behind, 19 TEX. REV. ENT. 
& SPORTS L. 81, 82 (2019); Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10, at 26–28 (explaining that professional 
gamers in the early days were deemed “independent contractors” because earnings solely came from 
prize money, but now gamer agreements involve a “level of control typically wielded by an employer” 
making gamers “wear certain brands or logos . . . , stream their play on specific platforms, reside in 
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“contracts have routinely favored organizations’ financial progress 
over players’ best interests.”47 This continues to exploit and force 
Esports professionals to work for low salaries on unfavorable terms.48 
Stated more bluntly, Esports players do not realize the rights they are 
contractually giving away.49 
Among the Esports professionals that are too “young, 
inexperienced with the workforce, and seemingly too busy to stop 
and consider if their job conditions seem fair,” Turner “Tfue” Tenney 
also fell victim to a “handshake deal, put to paper.”50 Tfue is a 
“social media celebrity and professional player of the video game 
Fortnite.”51 Tfue, in 2019, was one of the most popular players in the 
world of Fortnite—a multiplayer phenomenon known as “an 
open-world survival game, in which players collect resources, make 
tools and weapons, and try to stay alive as long as possible.”52 Tfue’s 
lawsuit alleged that FaZe Clan (FaZe), the Esports organization he 
signed with, violated California labor laws.53 FaZe is an “esports and 
 
specific locations, . . . and, more crucially, require that the player provide services exclusively to that 
company”). 
 47. Conditt, supra note 14; see also Tim Rizzo & Nick Geracie, Evolved Talent CEO Ryan Morrison 
Breaks Down Tfue’s Lawsuit Against FaZe Clan, INVEN GLOBAL (May 20, 2019), 
https://www.invenglobal.com/articles/8253/evolved-talent-ceo-ryan-morrison-breaks-down-tfues-
lawsuit-against-faze-clan [https://perma.cc/85WR-MSLR] (“When a non-esports attorney comes in and 
reviews an esports contract, what they usually comment is along the lines, ‘This is breaking the law in 
19 different ways. None of this is okay.’”). 
 48. Tagle, supra note 46, at 81 (“An attorney who represents professionals further described them as 
‘socially awkward,’ and ‘uncomfortable to ask for things.’ . . . Without the protections of labor 
organizations like those available to young professionals in traditional sports leagues, esports 
professionals often unknowingly sign contracts that deprive them of their rights.”). 
 49. McCann, supra note 36 (“There are also larger themes at stake. A key one is the notion that 
esports players are inadequately informed about the contracts they sign. A relatively 
straightforward . . . remedy to that concern would be for players to hire attorneys, particularly those with 
esports expertise.”). 
 50. Tagle, supra note 46; TROST ET AL., supra note 23. See generally Conditt, supra note 14. 
 51. FaZe Clan Inc. v. Tenney, 467 F. Supp. 3d 180, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (emphasis added). 
 52. Sarah LeBoeuf, What is ‘Fortnite’?: A Look at the Video Game That Has Become a 
Phenomenon, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/what-fortnite-look-video-game-
has-become-phenomenon-n887706 [https://perma.cc/EVF6-BYB5] (June 30, 2018, 11:27 AM); Conditt, 
supra note 14. 
 53. Conditt, supra note 14 (explaining that the TAA is designed to protect entertainers in California 
from raw representation deals and that the MAA is more restrictive than the TAA because the MAA 
bans sports teams from acting as representatives for their players). Rohan Nadkarni, The Stream Team, 
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entertainment organization that competes in video game tournaments 
and creates social media content.”54 His important lawsuit raises the 
question of “whether gamers should be entitled to the same agent 
protections as actors and artists in the traditional entertainment 
industry,” or rather as professional athletes.55 
Under the “nebulous nature of esports,” Tfue’s lawyers presented 
their client as an “artist,” which shined the light on gamers as 
“professional competitors and online entertainers in equal 
measure.”56 Professional gamers’ work is “arguably akin to 
performing art and athletic performance,” but some debate the 
connection between Esports and athletics.57 For its part, the 
International Olympic Committee, in considering whether to add 
Esports to the Olympic Games, reviewed the definition of 
“athleticism,” which includes “the kinds of hand-eye skills and other 
traits essential to esports.”58 
 
clan-kyler-murray-bronny-james [https://perma.cc/W3C2-74YN] (“Trink is the CEO of FaZe Clan, a 
gaming collective born in 2010 as a YouTube channel for creative ‘killshots’ performed in the video 
game Call of Duty. Now, depending on which side of the millennial–Gen Z line you sit, FaZe has grown 
into either a confusing digital behemoth that serves as a stark reminder of how the world has passed you 
by, or a cultural (and merchandising) force that bonds a disparate groups of gamers, athletes, musicians, 
influencers and content creators into an amorphous digital squad that has become the internet’s version 
of the cool kids’ table in your high school cafeteria.”). 
 54. FaZe Clan, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 183 (quoting Anderson Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 47-3). 
 55. Zagger, supra note 33; Conditt, supra note 14 (explaining that Tfue’s Twitter biography states 
that he is a “professional athlete,” but his lawyer seems to paint him with a different description). 
 56. Conditt, supra note 14 (quoting Barry Lee, senior agent at Evolved Talent Agency) (“The 
Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act is more for athletes, and if you look at how battle royale players have 
been monetizing, they’re esports players, but the way they make the bulk of their money is as 
influencers . . . . Legally, as a Fortnite streamer, Tfue is an entertainer first, not an athlete.” (quoting 
Barry Lee, senior agent at Evolved Talent Agency)). 
 57. McCann, supra note 36 (“Tenney’s complaint stresses that esports players perform, act, direct 
and edit their videos and then stream those videos to their millions of followers through YouTube and 
Twitch. With numerous views of the videos, advertising dollars and sponsorship opportunities are 
generated. . . . Tenney is the most watched Fortnite streamer on Twitch. Tenney’s complaint emphasizes 
that ‘sponsors are willing to pay for Tenney to perform in and create videos that will, at least in part, 
promote their goods, services and brands.’ Yet the deal he signed with FaZe Clan limits his capacity to 
profit from his talents.” (emphasis added) (quoting Complaint, supra note 36, at 2)). 
 58. Id.; Paris 2024 Olympics: Esports ‘in Talks’ to Be Included As Demonstration Sport, BBC: 
SPORT (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/43893891 [https://perma.cc/J2FC-9SBP] 
(“[The International Olympic Committee] said it is open to exploring the possibility of including esports 
in future Games, before stating at a November summit it ‘could be considered a sporting 
activity’ . . . .”). 
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Regardless of how Esports players are categorized, however, 
Tfue’s lawsuit emphasized the state of Esports’ legal landscape. 
Specifically, Tfue has “tor[n] into the manner” in which Esports 
companies use “heavy-handed” gamer agreements to “own” 
professional gamers in an industry “so new it lacks needed oversight 
and talent protection.”59 Due to this lack of industry oversight and 
scores of gamers unwilling or unable to stand up to it, Tfue argued 
that FaZe “enjoyed the fruits of this illegal business model with 
impunity”—but as the legal landscape around Esports evolves, “those 
days are over.”60 
II. ANALYSIS 
For some, Tfue’s lawsuit is comparable to a “high school band 
getting the[ir] first record deal” in that many Esports players eagerly 
sign the first contract thrown at them.61 Tfue’s attorneys painted the 
contract (Gamer Agreement) as one of the worst in talent history, but 
his employers begged to differ.62 Tfue contended that FaZe was 
 
 59. Konnath, supra note 15 (“FaZe Clan exploits and takes advantage of young, ‘unsophisticated, 
unseasoned and trusting’ gamers, saddling them with contracts that ‘severely limit’ them from exploring 
deals with other companies and strip them of most of their earnings . . . .” (quoting Complaint, supra 
note 36, at 2–3)). 
 60. Id. (stating that Tfue seeks injunctive relief against FaZe and that a win for Tfue would reshape 
contracts in the Esports industry); Hailey Konnath, FaZe Clan Counterstrikes Esports Gamer with 
$20M Suit, LAW360 (Aug. 1, 2019, 11:13 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1184611/faze-clan-
counterstrikes-esports-gamer-with-20m-suit (“This is the first time in the history of esports that an 
organization has had the audacity to try and enforce contractual provisions that are so clearly illegal 
against one [of] its gamers.” (alteration in original)). The conditions are quite worrisome: 
Player conditions are particularly troubling when one recalls that many of these 
professional players are minors. Although Riot has a self-imposed minimum age of 
17 for its professional League of Legends players, other developers and leagues can—
and do—allow teams to contract with even younger teenagers. In traditional sports, 
collectively bargained agreements handle questions of age minimums; in their 
nascent stages, traditional American sports also accepted players of all ages. It took 
decades of negotiation and litigation to reach the point where leagues included age 
restrictions as part of a collectively bargained agreement. 
Hollist, supra note 21, at 835 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 61. Thooorin, supra note 38. 
 62. ‘Fortnite’ Gamer Tfue’s Contract with FaZe Clan Finally Revealed!, THE BLAST [hereinafter 
Tfue’s Contract], https://theblast.com/esports-gamer-tfue-faze-clan-contract-revealed/ 
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operating as a talent management firm while not licensed to do so 
under California law and that several parts of the contract violated 
laws dealing with anticompetition.63 
Tfue and FaZe’s “relationship does not seem much different from 
a sports agency model for an athlete or an entertainment agency 
representing talent,” but the lawsuit poses an important question as to 
what law regulates representatives of Esports gamers.64 If Esports are 
a “sport” and professional gamers are “athletes,” then the MAA 
applies.65 If Esports are “media and entertainment,” then the TAA 
applies.66 Esports could also be something entirely new—perhaps an 
entity comprised of “influencers” that requires new regulations.67 The 
need for new regulations is clear given state legislatures’ 
unintentional division of athletes in different statutes and the 
presence of unartfully drafted, conflicting definitions of “athlete.”68 
The industry is changing, and Tfue’s lawsuit finally brought to the 
forefront the issue of the lack of regulation in the Esports industry 
 
seen in almost 30 years of practicing law.” (quoting Bryan J. Freedman, attorney for Tfue)). 
 63. Id. (explaining that Tfue’s major concern is that the Gamer Agreement entitles FaZe to millions 
if the agreement is extended for another three years). 
 64. Jeremy Evans, 5 Solutions to the Esports Industry Regulation Dilemma, SPORTS RADIO AM.: 
SPORTS BUS. (July 7, 2019), https://sportsradioamerica.com/2019/07/07/5-solutions-to-the-esports-
industry-regulation-dilemma/ [https://perma.cc/J9YB-WCQK] (opening with the solution of creating a 
professional gamer’s union, but then quickly dismantling the proposal because unions do not solve all 
players’ concerns, specifically those of individual athletes because some professional video games are 
single-player). 
 65. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18895 (West 2017); Evans, supra note 64 (stating that attorneys fall 
in “legislative purgatory” because they will be required to get an agency license, file a disclosure 
statement, and pay a small fee). 
 66. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 (West 2013); Evans, supra note 64. 
 67. Evans, supra note 64 (explaining how the Esports industry is changing traditional entertainment 
and media industries and proposing a new model in regulation in light of a newly crafted and unique 
Esports industry). 
 68. Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, Athlete Agent Legislation in the New Millennium: State Statutes and 
the Uniform Athlete Agents Act, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 263, 277 (2001) (chastising the vagueness 
and overbreadth of the statutes, paired with the numerous constitutional defects, which result in statutory 
loopholes from unartfully drafted language); Rob Remis & Diane Sudia, Escaping Athlete Agent 
Statutory Regulation: Loopholes and Constitutional Defectiveness Based on Tri-Parte Classification of 
Athletes, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 1, 3–4 (1999) (harping on the fact that many athlete agent statutes 
are so poorly drafted that some legislatures purposely limit the scope of the statute to avoid regulating 
some types of athletes, and that other legislatures inadvertently use terminology that overreaches to 
different types of athletes). 
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and the confusing and outdated regulations applicable to a 
predominantly older industry.69 
A. Talent Agency Act 
Tfue’s lawyers portrayed Tfue as an artist, not an athlete, zealously 
advocating that Tfue should be afforded the protection from “raw 
representation deals” given by California’s TAA.70 Indeed, the 
California Courts of Appeal has stated: the TAA “should be liberally 
construed” to protect agents’ clients.71 
Tfue claimed his agreement with FaZe violated the TAA by 
procuring employment for Tfue without a license and allowed FaZe 
to take “grossly high commissions.”72 In cases considered by the 
California Labor Commission where the alleged agent did not have a 
license, the vast majority of the corresponding agreements were 
found to be void.73 In fact, the Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, 
 
 69. Evans, supra note 64. See generally Joost, Esports Governance and Its Failures, MEDIUM (Oct. 
16, 2017), https://medium.com/@heyimJoost/esports-governance-and-its-failures-9ac7b3ec37ea 
[https://perma.cc/LYG4-RE75] (examining the lack of a unified source of governance in creating two 
other significant issues: the absence of regulations for competitive integrity and the lack of policy 
concerning a duty of care towards players). 
 70. Conditt, supra note 14 (highlighting that Tfue’s lawsuit is spurring conversation across 
influencer and Esports spaces). But see Tfue (@TTfue), TWITTER (May 2014), 
https://twitter.com/TTfue?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor 
[https://perma.cc/PJR8-QUXT] (highlighting “Professional Athlete” in his biography). 
 71. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prods., Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 441–42 (Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he Act 
should be liberally construed to promote the general object sought to be accomplished . . . . To ensure 
the personal, professional, and financial welfare of artists, the Act strictly regulates a talent agent’s 
conduct.” (footnotes omitted) (citing Henning v. Indus. Welfare Com., 46 Cal. 3d 1262, 1269 (1988)); 
David Zelenski, Talent Agents, Personal Managers, and Their Conflicts in the New Hollywood, 76 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 979, 984–85 (2003). The TAA’s purpose is to protect artists from ill-willed 
representatives, for example: 
[I]t prohibits agents from giving their clients false or misleading information 
concerning employment engagements; from sending them to unsafe places; from 
allowing “prostitutes, gamblers, [or] intoxicated persons . . . [to] be employed 
in . . . the place of business of the talent agency”; from arranging unlawful 
employment for minors; and from splitting fees with the employers who hire their 
clients. 
Zelenski, supra (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.35 (West 
2013)). 
 72. Zagger, supra note 33. 
 73. Determination of Controversy at 4, 8, Beaudoin v. Macalpin, No. TAC 48086 (Cal. Lab. 
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Inc. decision stands for the bright-line rule that any unlicensed 
activity is covered by the TAA.74 In Waisbren, a personal manager 
brought an action against puppet creators for an alleged breach of an 
agreement to pay him the right percentage of their profits.75 Citing 
the California Entertainment Commission, the court highlighted the 
simple approach to the regulation of agents and managers: “one 
either is, or is not, licensed as a talent agent, and, if not so licensed, 
one cannot expect to engage . . . in any activity relating to the 
services which a talent agent is licensed to render.”76 The court held 
that the personal manager who procured employment for the artist, 
even as an incidental portion of his business, was subject to the 
licensing requirements of the TAA and granted summary judgment 
for the puppet creators.77 Looking through the lenses of the Waisbren 
court, surely the absence of FaZe’s license cuts in favor of Tfue’s 
claim. 
If a client’s representative violates the TAA, the client can 
complain to the Labor Commissioner, who has exclusive authority to 
hear and resolve disputes unless arbitration is required.78 In the spirit 
 
personality—and an aspiring television and motion picture actor—and the manager for failure to 
procure a license); Determination of Controversy at 9, Goldsmith v. Klein, No. TAC 46430 (Cal. Lab. 
Comm’n May 24, 2018) (finding invalid and unenforceable an oral contract between an actor 
performing in television shows, commercials, and motion pictures and an unlicensed talent agent); 
Determination of Controversy at 7, Johnson v. Healey, No. TAC 16243 (Cal. Lab. Comm’n Oct. 8, 
2018) (finding invalid and unenforceable an endorsement contract between a world-renowned model 
and an unlicensed talent agency and ordering the talent agency to disgorge amount due); Thooorin, 
supra note 38. 
 74. 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444; Gutenkunst, supra note 39, at 120. 
 75. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437. 
 76. Id. at 444. The California legislature created the California Entertainment Commission in 1982 
to study the laws of California, New York, and other key entertainment cities in relation to licensing of 
agents of artists in the entertainment industry to recommend a model bill regarding licensing. Id. at 442–
43. 
 77. Id. at 437. 
 78. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a) (West 2013) (“In cases of controversy arising under this chapter, 
the parties involved shall refer the matters in dispute to the Labor Commissioner, who shall hear and 
determine the same, subject to an appeal within 10 days after determination, to the superior court where 
the same shall be heard de novo.”); Zelenski, supra note 71. See generally Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 
346, 349–50 (2008) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts the TAA and reversing and 
remanding the California Court of Appeal’s decision to deny arbitration and grant personnel in the 
motion picture–television industries’ motion to stay action pending proceedings before Labor 
Commissioner). 
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of the policy behind the TAA, California law provides a remedy 
where any “unlicensed person’s contract with an artist to provide the 
services of a talent agent is illegal and void.”79 If viewed in this light 
by a court, Tfue’s contract with FaZe could be declared illegal and 
void. FaZe’s lawyers opposed Tfue’s claims, arguing alongside other 
managers that the Labor Commissioner had wrongfully disgorged or 
negotiated away payments to managers, which were estimated to cost 
the profession more than half a billion dollars.80 
Under the TAA, a talent agent or agency engages in procuring 
employment for an artist.81 Additionally, the TAA defines “artist” as 
follows: 
[A]ctors and actresses rendering services on the legitimate 
stage and in the production of motion pictures, radio artists, 
musical artists, musical organizations, directors of 
legitimate stage, motion picture and radio productions, 
musical directors, writers, cinematographers, composers, 
lyricists, arrangers, models, and other artists and persons 
rendering professional services in motion picture, 
theatrical, radio, television and other entertainment 
 
 79. Styne v. Stevens, 26 P.3d 343, 349 (Cal. 2001) (“The Act is remedial; its purpose is to protect 
artists seeking professional employment from the abuses of talent agencies.” (first citing Waisbren, 48 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437; and then citing Buchwald v. Superior Ct., 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Ct. App. 1967))); 
Buchwald, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (holding that contracts of the members of a professional musical group 
and an unlicensed talent manager were entitled to relief, and annulling orders of the superior court); 
Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437; Gutenkunst, supra note 39, at 118. 
 80. See generally Nat’l Conf. of Pers. Managers, Inc. v. Brown, 690 F. App’x 461, 461 (9th Cir. 
2017) (granting a motion to dismiss by holding in part that the TAA did not violate due process or the 
Commerce Clause and did not implicate the First Amendment); Showbiz Personal Managers Say Talent 
Agencies Act Unconstitutional, DEADLINE (Nov. 13, 2012, 2:05 PM), 
https://deadline.com/2012/11/showbiz-personal-managers-say-talent-agencies-act-unconstitutional-
371031/ [https://perma.cc/8SLW-MSKL]. 
 81. CAL. LAB. CODE LAB. § 1700.4(a) (West 2013). The statute provides as follows: 
“Talent agency” means a person or corporation who engages in the occupation of 
procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagements 
for an artist or artists, except that the activities of procuring, offering, or promising to 
procure recording contracts for an artist or artists shall not of itself subject a person or 
corporation to regulation and licensing under this chapter. Talent agencies may, in 
addition, counsel or direct artists in the development of their professional careers. 
Id.; see also Zelenski, supra note 71, at 985. 
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enterprises.”82 
This catchall provision under the decades-old statute’s definition 
of “artist” plays a key point in classifying Tfue as an artist or athlete, 
thus determining the applicable law. 
A string of California cases provides some insight into entities 
violating the TAA and how courts have handled such violations. In 
Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v. Blasi, Marathon sued Rosa Blasi for 
breach of contract and sought recovery of unpaid commissions.83 
Blasi argued that Marathon procured employment as an unregistered 
talent agent in violation of the TAA.84 The labor commissioner 
concluded that “any person who procures employment—any 
individual, any corporation, any manager—is a talent agency subject 
to regulation” and that Marathon violated the TAA because it failed 
to secure a license and thus “voided the parties’ contract ab initio and 
barred Marathon from recovery.”85 
In Parapluie, Inc. v. Mills, the plaintiff acted as the defendant’s 
representative and secured her a number of opportunities, including 
appearances on the Larry King Show and the Celebrity Apprentice, a 
 
 82. LAB. § 1700.4(b) (emphasis added). 
 83. 174 P.3d 741, 744 (Cal. 2008). The court characterized their relationship as follows: 
In 1998, Marathon and Blasi entered into an oral contract for Marathon to serve as 
Blasi’s personal manager. Marathon was to counsel Blasi and promote her career; in 
exchange, Blasi was to pay Marathon 15 percent of her earnings from entertainment 
employment obtained during the course of the contract. During the ensuing three 
years, Blasi’s professional appearances included a role in a film, Noriega: God’s 
Favorite (Industry Entertainment 2000), and a lead role as Dr. Luisa Delgado on the 
television series Strong Medicine. 
Id. 
 84. Id.; Determination of Controversy at 5, Blasi v. Marathon Ent., Inc., No. TAC 15-03 (Cal. Lab. 
Comm’n Jan. 30, 2004) (arguing that a California corporation individually procured an audition, 
appearances on talk shows, and acting roles for an actress). 
 85. Marathon Ent., 174 P.3d at 744, 747. The Labor Commissioner stated: 
In sum, petitioners have proved that respondents procured or attempted to procure 
work for petitioners through contacting casting directors, sending out demo tapes of 
petitioner Blasi, submitting petitioner Blasi for certain roles as an actress, and 
securing auditions in plays and appearances on talk shows. Respondents, however, 
have not met their burden of proving that each one of these engagements was 
requested by Bressler-Kelly and done in conjunction with Bressler-Kelly. 
Consequently, respondents are in violation of the Act. 
Determination of Controversy, supra note 84, at 7. 
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deal with TrimSpa, deals with PSDI USA and Gemini Fragrances, 
the chance to be a judge for the Miss USA pageant, and guest 
appearances on the daytime drama Days of Our Lives.86 The 
defendant argued that the plaintiff was not a licensed talent agent, 
and the plaintiff conceded this point but defended on the grounds that 
the defendant was not an artist.87 The court concluded that the 
defendant was an artist under the broad language of the TAA, 
specifically the clause covering “other entertainment enterprises.”88 
Thus, the court found that the TAA did apply to the contract in 
dispute and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.89 
Marathon and Mills provide a framework to guide a consideration 
of the Gamer Agreement at the heart of Tfue’s relationship with 
FaZe. The Gamer Agreement is similar to the endorsement contract 
at issue in Marathon, and the broad interpretation of the definition of 
“artist” in the statute would seem to include professional gamers 
under the broad language of “other entertainment enterprises.” 
Further, the consistent entertainment value and notoriety of Tfue’s 
employment with FaZe rise at least to the artistic level of the variety 
of entertainment “odd jobs” secured by the talent agency for the 
defendant in Mills. FaZe’s lack of compliance in obtaining a license 
would thus likely lead a court to “void[] the parties’ contract ab 
initio.”90 
 
 86. No. CV 11-02548, 2012 WL 12887556, at *3, *14 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012). 
 87. Id. at *13 (“Plaintiff does not dispute that neither it nor Blanchard are licensed. It contends, 
however, that Heather is not an ‘artist’ within the meaning of the TAA, and that the statute therefore 
does not apply.” (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5 (West 2013))). 
 88. Id. at *14 & n.78 (emphasis added) (“Heather testified that she did not consider herself an 
‘actor,’ but a ‘TV presenter.’ . . . Her characterization of her work is not dispositive, however, and the 
statute’s broad definition of artist appears to encompass a ‘TV presenter’ as well.” (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted)). 
 89. Id. at *16. 
 90. Marathon Ent., 174 P.3d at 744. The following actions provide an example of a contract voided 
ab initio: 
After obtaining a stay of the action, Blasi filed a petition with the Labor 
Commissioner alleging that Marathon had violated the Act by soliciting and 
procuring employment for Blasi without a talent agency license. The Labor 
Commissioner agreed. The Commissioner found Marathon had procured various 
engagements for Blasi, including a role in the television series Strong Medicine. 
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B. Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act 
Alternatively, Tfue’s lawyers could have chosen to present Tfue as 
an athlete to access the protections of the MAA.91 The MAA became 
effective January 1, 1997.92 In support of the MAA, California 
Assembly Member Gary Miller compared “sports agents to drug 
dealers who prey on kids.”93 
The MAA’s restrictions on athlete agents are more stringent than 
those placed on talent agents by the TAA.94 The MAA broadly 
defines an “athlete agent” but fails to define what an athlete is.95 In 
addition, the MAA quickly sets forth that an “athlete agent” does not 
include a talent agency.96 The closest definition provided to clarify 
what an athlete is, with respect to professional sports, states that it is 
one who has “employment as a professional athlete,” including both 
endorsement and professional services contracts.97 Further, the MAA 
defines “endorsement contract” as an agreement where a person is 
employed because of “publicity, reputation, fame, or following 
obtained because of athletic ability or performance.”98 
 
violated the Act, the Commissioner voided the parties’ contract ab initio and barred 
Marathon from recovery. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 91. Conditt, supra note 14. 
 92. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18895 (West 2017). 
 93. Baker, supra note 41, at 267. 
 94. Maryn Oyoung, Chapter 63: Renegotiating the Role of Athlete Agents, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
528, 529 (2012). 
 95. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18895.2(b)(1) (West 2017). The statute provides: 
“Athlete agent” means any person who, directly or indirectly, recruits or solicits 
an athlete to enter into any agent contract, endorsement contract, financial 
services contract, or professional sports services contract, or for compensation 
procures, offers, promises, attempts, or negotiates to obtain employment for any 
person with a professional sports team or organization or as a professional athlete. 
Id.; see also Baker, supra note 41, at 272; Smith, supra note 43. 
 96. BUS. & PROF. § 18895.2(b)(2)(C) (“‘Athlete agent’ also does not include a talent agency . . . .”). 
 97. BUS. & PROF. § 18895.2(c) (“‘Employment as a professional athlete’ includes employment 
pursuant to an endorsement contract or a professional sports services contract.”); Oyoung, supra note 
94. 
 98. BUS. & PROF. § 18895.2(d) (emphasis added) (“‘Endorsement contract’ means any contract or 
agreement pursuant to which a person is employed or receives remuneration for any value or utility that 
the person may have because of publicity, reputation, fame, or following obtained because of athletic 
ability or performance.”). 
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In Fighters Inc. v. Electronic Arts Inc., a dispute arose when 
Electronic Arts (EA) used professional boxers’ images in a video 
game after the group of boxers signed a group licensing agreement 
with Fighters.99 EA argued that the agreement was invalid because 
(1) Fighters did not comply with the requirements of the MAA, (2) 
Fighters qualified as an “athlete agent” based on interactions with 
professional boxers, and (3) the use of their images qualified as an 
endorsement contract.100 The court declined Fighters’ motion for 
preliminary injunction, stating that “because Fighters is arguably 
constrained by the requirements of the Miller Ayala Act, the 
Agreement’s validity remains unclear at this stage.”101 
The Fighters case provides a comparison for Tfue’s Gamer 
Agreement with FaZe. A clear reading of the Agreement 
demonstrates it is similar to both the licensing agreement at issue in 
Fighters and an endorsement contract as defined in the MAA. Thus, 
following the Court’s reasoning in Fighters, FaZe would similarly be 
found in jeopardy of not complying with the MAA’s strict 
requirements, and the Gamer Agreement could be declared void and 
unenforceable. 
Interestingly, soon after the passage of the MAA, the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association and others from the National 
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws drafted a 
model law regulating athlete agents.102 The model legislation became 
 
 99. No. CV 09-06389, 2009 WL 10699504, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009). 
 100. Id. at *3. 
 101. Id. at *4. 
 102. Baker, supra note 41, at 271; Athlete Agents Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=cef8ae71-2f7b-4404-9af5-
309bb70e861e [https://perma.cc/2CYU-7VPK]. The Uniform Law Commission produced the following 
statement with regard to the legislation adopted by many states besides California: 
The Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act (RUAAA) is an update of the Uniform 
Athlete Agents Act of 2000, which has been enacted in 42 states. The 2000 Act 
governs relations among student athletes, athlete agents, and educational institutions, 
protecting the interests of student athletes and academic institutions by regulating the 
activities of athlete agents. The Revised Act was promulgated in 2015 and makes 
numerous changes to the original act, including expanding the definition of “athlete 
agent” and “student athlete”; providing for reciprocal registration between states; 
adding new requirements to the signing of an agency contract; and expanding 




Published by Reading Room, 2021
1024 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
known as the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA); currently 
thirty-nine states have adopted the UAAA.103 California opted not to 
formally adopt the UAAA, choosing instead what some have called a 
“draconian system of regulating and penalizing” athlete agents.104 
California’s choice, like that of the few other nonadoptive states, has 
played an enabling hand in the confusing and conflicting definitions, 
classifications, regulations, prohibited conduct, and possible penalties 
between the various statutes governing athletes and their agents.105 
C. Overall Gamer Agreement 
FaZe and Tfue’s relationship soured just a year after entering into 
the Gamer Agreement. The split gave rise to three lawsuits: (1) 
Tfue’s action before the California Labor Commissioner arguing that 
the Agreement was void under the TAA, (2) Tfue’s action in 
California Superior Court arguing the Agreement was void ab initio 
under the MAA, and (3) FaZe’s lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York asserting four causes of action for 
breach of the Agreement and five related tort and quasi-contract 
claims.106 
 
athletes more freedom and flexibility when choosing between entering a professional 
draft or continuing their collegiate education. 
Athlete Agents Act, supra. 
 103. Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801–7807; Chris Deubert, What’s a 
“Clean” Agent to Do? The Case for a Cause of Action Against a Player’s Association, 18 JEFFREY S. 
MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 1, 5 (2011). 
 104. Baker, supra note 41, at 299; Smith, supra note 43. 
 105. Deubert, supra note 103. 
 106. FaZe Clan Inc. v. Tenney, 467 F. Supp. 3d 180, 183–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). With regard to Tfue’s 
first action, the Southern District of New York stated that the “merits of Tenney’s TAA claims are not 
properly before this Court [because] California law designates the [California Labor Commission] as the 
original tribunal for all TAA claims.” Id. at 186. One of FaZe’s causes of actions was for unjust 
enrichment. Id. at 194. Tfue moved for conditional summary judgment in his favor arguing that a 
declaration that the Gamer Agreement was void under the TAA would “also bar FaZe Clan from 
recovering under a theory of unjust enrichment.” Id. (arguing that “the policy rationale of the TAA is so 
strong that the statute forbids unlicensed talent agents from recovering from their clients either in 
contract or in quasi-contract” (citing Yoo v. Robi, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740 (Ct. App. 2005))). The court 
disagreed and pointed to the narrow reading of this point in Marathon Entertainment where the Supreme 
Court of California found that the TAA permits partial recovery for an unlicensed talent agency 
operating in violation of the statute. Id. at 194 (citing Marathon Ent., Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 754 
(Cal. 2008)). Thus, the court denied Tfue’s motion for summary judgment on this claim. Id. 
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FaZe brought claims under New York law against Tfue for breach 
of contract, intentional interference with contract, tortious 
interference with prospective business advantage, and unjust 
enrichment.107 Tfue counterclaimed and asserted defenses under the 
TAA.108 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.109 
Tfue’s chief complaint about his contract with FaZe was that the 
“representatives of esports players . . . need to be regulated much like 
the agents of film and TV stars.”110 The Gamer Agreement was 
originally created April 27, 2018, and was to last for six months, with 
an automatic extension for an additional thirty-six months provided 
Tfue met certain conditions.111 FaZe could elect to extend the 
contract at its sole discretion and could increase or decrease Tfue’s 
salary by as much as 25%.112 
Tfue accused FaZe of unlawfully acting as his agent and brought 
to light whether gamers should be entitled to the same agent 
protections as actors and artists in the traditional entertainment 
industry.113 Tfue claimed FaZe collected up to 80% of the revenue 
from third parties and prevented him from signing lucrative 
sponsorships.114 Further, he claimed that the agreement was both 
“grossly oppressive, onerous, and one-sided” and unjust because 
Tfue was the artist performing the services and his celebrity status 
 
 107. Id. at 180. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Michael Hassall, Tfue Hits FaZe Clan with Lawsuit, UPCOMER (May 20, 2019), 
https://old.upcomer.com/fortnite/story/1418257/tfue-faze-clan-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/ZZ8E-V8N7]. 
 111. Tfue’s Contract, supra note 62. The Agreement states: 
[I]nitial Term of this Agreement shall be six (6) months from the Effective Date 
(“Term”). At the end of the Term, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary set 
forth in this Agreement (including the T&Cs), . . . (this) Agreement shall be 
automatically extended for an additional thirty-six (36) months, provided the 
following conditions have been met[:] Play on the Team, which includes participating 
in tournaments and training sessions with the Team and representing the Team, 
including at events arranged by Company or where Company decides to participate, 
and provide publicity and promotional services as required by Company. 
Id. 
 112. McCann, supra note 36. 
 113. Zagger, supra note 33. 
 114. Conditt, supra note 14. 
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was the primary draw to the profitable endorsements.115 Tfue’s 
complaint stressed that Esports players “perform, act, direct and edit 
their videos and then stream those videos” in a similar fashion to 
artists and that FaZe has rejected some sponsorship deals due to a 
glaring conflict of interest.116 Tfue and his lawyers described the 
Gamer Agreement and the terms within as unconscionable and in 
violation of laws governing artists or athlete representation.117 
FaZe swiftly denied the allegations and claimed it had only 
received $60,000 from the Gamer Agreement and had not collected 
any money from Tfue’s online tournament winnings.118 FaZe also 
asserted that Tfue voluntarily and lawfully signed the Gamer 
Agreement at a legal age—which will be a key argument in FaZe’s 
defense.119 California courts, like most, are wary of calling contracts 
unfair, and Tfue’s formal complaint exemplified this reality by 
failing to include a cause of action that claimed the contract was 
unconscionable.120 
The Gamer Agreement required Tfue to strictly adhere to many 
different terms such as playing in tournaments and training sessions, 
using three days a month for “publicity and promotional services,” 
wearing FaZe clothing and merchandise associated with sponsors, 
participating in social media campaigns, and representing FaZe 
 
 115. Id.; McCann, supra note 36. 
 116. McCann, supra note 36. Consider the following description: 
Tenney’s complaint asserts that he created and performed in a video for sponsor 
Digital Storm, a manufacturer of gaming computers. The video garnered over 
[nineteen] million views, but Tenney insists without accompanying financial gain to 
him. Tenney charges that FaZe Clan has unlawfully retained payments that should 
have been paid to Tenney. . . . This purported deal would have been with HyperX, 
makers of headsets and headphones. Tenney claims that FaZe Clan “passed on the 
sponsorship deal” because it “perceived that HyperX was a competitor of another 
sponsor that did business with FaZe Clan.” Tenney argues that in passing on the deal, 
“FaZe Clan knowingly acted against Tenney’s interest by preventing third-parties 
from helping Tenney source sponsorship deals.” 
Id. (quoting Complaint, supra note 36, at 12). 
 117. Zagger, supra note 33. 
 118. Conditt, supra note 14. 
 119. McCann, supra note 36. 
 120. Thooorin, supra note 38. 
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exclusively within the industry.121 In return, FaZe would pay Tfue 
$2,000 per month as a fixed fee and claim 50% of Tfue’s creator 
code income, 80% from brand deals brought to Tfue by FaZe, and 
50% from brand deals brought to FaZe by Tfue (despite the fact that 
Tfue himself brought in the deal).122 
Even more restrictive, the exclusivity period following lawful 
termination of the Gamer Agreement, if elected, allowed FaZe to 
automatically exercise exclusive rights to Tfue’s services in a manner 
similar to the past restricted free agency in the National Football 
League.123 Further, if the parties did not strike a deal during the 
exclusivity period and Tfue signed with another team, FaZe could 
still match the offer.124 Tfue could only sign with another team after 
two full months without any type of restriction from FaZe.125 Finally, 
 
 121. McCann, supra note 36. 
 122. Tfue’s Contract, supra note 62 (“In the gaming industry, ‘creator code income’ can be 
astronomical. . . . [S]ources say Tfue’s income is pushing $10 million dollars per year.”). Also, the 
“contract states that FaZe will pay Tfue ‘$2,000 per month’ as a fixed fee, plus ‘[a]ll other income 
(including, but not limited to, salaries, earnings, fees, royalties, bonuses, share of profits, and gifts, etc.) 
generated in connection with Gamer’s Services (whether individually or as part of the Team).’” Id.; 
FaZe Clan Inc. v. Tenney, 467 F. Supp. 3d 180, 183–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). The Southern District of New 
York considered whether the Gamer Agreement obligated Tfue to split this revenue with FaZe. FaZe 
Clan, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (finding the term “in-game merchandise” vague and the definition of 
“‘in-game/sticker’ . . . totally unhelpful in discerning its meaning” and therefore looking to extraneous 
evidence to determine the parties’ intent). The court concluded that Tfue introduced overwhelming 
evidence that the parties, prior to litigation, did not intend the term “in-game merchandise” to 
encompass Tfue’s sales through the Support-A-Creator Program. Id. Thus, this evidence raised a 
genuine factual dispute as to whether the parties intended the Gamer Agreement to cover the revenue 
stream, warranting denial of FaZe’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 190. 
 123. See FaZe Clan, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 192. The Agreement provides: 
[If] Gamer receives an offer from another “Fortnite” team to join such team upon 
lawful termination of the Agreement by Gamer (“Offer”), Gamer shall be obligated to 
provide the Offer to Company and the identity of the party providing the Offer, and 
Company shall have the right to match such Offer during a period of fifteen (15) 
business days following Company’s actual receipt of the Offer (the “Matching 
Right”). If Company elects to exercise the Matching Right, Company shall inform 
Gamer within said fifteen (15) business day period, and Company shall, automatically 
have exclusive rights to Gamer’s services on the same terms as the Offer, as 
supplemented by all of the terms and conditions of the Agreement. 
Tfue’s Contract, supra note 62. 
 124. McCann, supra note 36. 
 125. Id. 
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if FaZe fired Tfue for a material breach, Tfue would be forced to sit 
idle for six months and not play video games professionally.126 
The Southern District of New York denied FaZe’s motion for 
summary judgment against Tfue’s counterclaims and defenses under 
the MAA.127 
Evident by the Gamer Agreement’s terms, the Esports 
industry-norm contract needs to be shredded, and the relationship 
between professional gamers and organizations needs to be 
reevaluated.128 Esports is a growing industry and is in the midst of 
creating structure, and Tfue’s lawsuit started to pave the way into 
forcing Esports companies into regulatory schemes similar to ones 
governing traditional artists and talent agencies.129 Ultimately, FaZe 
and Tfue settled the lawsuit.  
D. Gamer Agreement Compared to Traditional Sports and Modeling 
Tfue’s lawsuit and his Gamer Agreement with FaZe highlight how 
fascinating the sports law field is and the interesting changes 
currently happening with the explosion of Esports.130 For top-tier 
professional gamers, video games are more than just a hobby or 
pastime—to some it is a source of livelihood.131 Some may be 
 
 126. Tfue’s Contract, supra note 62 (“In the event of termination for a Gamer Material Breach, 
Gamer shall be prohibited from playing video games publicly (on-line or in live tournaments) or 
professionally for a period of six (6) months from the effective date of such termination.”). 
  127. FaZe Clan, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 187 (finding that the restrictions mentioned supra “fall within the 
ambit of [the MAA]”). 
 128. Thooorin, supra note 38. 
 129. Tricia Gorman, Online Gamer Fights Allegedly Exploitive Esports Contract, 37 WESTLAW J. 
COMPUT. & INTERNET 12, 12 (2019); Thooorin, supra note 38. Recently, Tfue and FaZe settled their 
lawsuit. Julia Alexander, Tfue Settles Lawsuit Against FaZe Clan over ‘Oppressive’ Gaming Contract, 
THE VERGE (Aug. 26, 2020, 5:08 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/26/21403052/tfue-faze-clan-
lawsuit-settled-streaming-events-competition-esports [https://perma.cc/ZJP2-ZVMK]. See generally 
FaZe Clan Inc. v. Tenney, 19-CV-7200, 2020 WL 4597321 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2020). 
 130. Robert P. Garbarino, So You Want to Be a Sports Lawyer, or Is It a Player Agent, Player 
Representative, Sports Agent, Contract Advisor, Family Advisor or Contract Representative?, 1 
JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 11, 44 (1994). 
 131. Hannah Dwan, What Are Esports? A Beginner’s Guide, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 18, 2017, 1:15 PM), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/gaming/guides/esports-beginners-guide/ [https://perma.cc/8J6M-76X8]. On 
other fronts, Derek Micheau’s varsity-level scholarship for the nation’s first varsity Esports team to play 
League of Legends also suggests considering him as a traditional athlete. Rianne Coale, If You Don’t 
Think Pro Gamers Are Athletes, Consider This, CHI. TRIB. (June 21, 2016, 2:59 PM), 
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hesitant to place professional gamers in the same category as baseball 
or football stars, but there are “many factors supporting such a 
classification.”132 Esports tournaments are frequently held in 
traditional sports venues and receive coverage from major sports 
television networks.133 These major cable networks such as TBS and 
ESPN broadcast matches of video games including StarCraft and 
Counter-Strike: Global Offensive.134 
Tfue’s position with regard to FaZe displays the major tension in 
the sports industry today: young, naïve gamers potentially worth 
millions must “wade through a pool of sports agents who, like 
barracudas, swarm the athlete and use any means necessary to sap 
just a little bit of that athlete’s economic lifeblood for their own 
benefit.”135 However, these agents would be out of business in the 




 132. Coale, supra note 131 (“Our interest isn’t going away and will continue to grow as eSports 
continues to grow . . . . We recognize the fact that there is an audience there. You’ll continue to see us 
making progressive and incremental moves and our interest intensify in the future.” (quoting John 
Lasker, ESPN Vice President of Programming and Acquisitions)); Maryanne Kline, The Thrill of a Visa, 
the Agony of Denial: Visa Challenges for the Esports Athlete, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/thrill-visa-agony-denial-visa-challenges-esports-athlete 
[https://perma.cc/4ZXX-8ZEV]. 
 133. Jacob Wolf, League of Legends to Be Broadcast on ESPN+, ESPN: ESPORTS (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/23597723/league-legends-broadcast-espn+ 
[https://perma.cc/6H6C-KH9G]; Kline, supra note 132 (“For example, the League of Legends 
Championship has been held at Madison Square Garden and the Staples Center and has been broadcast 
by ESPN.”). 
 134. Basim Usmani, Is It Time for eSports Gamers to Be Recognised As Athletes?, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 8, 2016, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/08/esports-pro-video-
gamers-recognised-athletes [https://perma.cc/JJ53-2PU9]. Esports viewership is on the rise: 
While there have been scant studies about the popularity of eSports versus traditional 
televised sporting events among young people, there’s no reason to believe eSports 
won’t grow in viewership. Super Smash Bros Melee came out in 2001, but the largest 
Super Smash Bros Melee tournament ever is taking place this July at Evo 2016. Last 
year, the Evo stream for Super Smash Bros Melee broke the 200,000 viewer mark, 
setting a new record for concurrent viewers at a fighting game event. 
Id. 
 135. Brian Charles Lea, Note, Sports Are Big Business, So Stop Playing Games: Why Federal 
Regulation Should Require Every Sports Agent to Possess a J.D., 1 J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 20, 21 (2009). 
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model” used by teams where “a player became . . . property . . . for as 
long as the team desired.”136 
The reserve clause cemented in the Tfue’s Gamer Agreement is 
reminiscent of a similar clause in Curt Flood’s lawsuit against the 
Major League Baseball.137 Flood argued that the reserve clause 
essentially equated players to property and, in so arguing, set in 
motion the process that “would lead to freedom of career choice and 
bargaining power for professional athletes in all leagues,” but the 
Supreme Court ruled against him.138 Flood’s case paved the way for 
Peter Seiz’s arbitration case, where Seiz relied on Flood’s same 
arguments and successfully brought about free agency in baseball.139 
Almost half a century later, and in a context few would have 
imagined at the time, Tfue’s reserve clause draws on those same 
sentiments to illuminate how FaZe prevented deals on his behalf.140 
Tfue also asserted that the restraints embedded in the Gamer 
Agreement denied him the opportunity to seek his own deals and 
fully profit from the use of his name, image, and likeness—an 
argument similar to the one raised in Ed O’Bannon’s lawsuit against 
the NCAA.141 
In addition, the U.S. government has shown a willingness to 
recognize gamers as athletes in the traditional sense. Esports 
 
 136. Id. at 23. 
 137. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 258 (1972). The reserve system is depicted as follows: 
To non-athletes it might appear that petitioner was virtually enslaved by the owners 
of major league baseball clubs who bartered among themselves for his services. But, 
athletes know that it was not servitude that bound petitioner to the club owners; it was 
the reserve system. The essence of that system is that a player is bound to the club 
with which he first signs a contract for the rest of his playing days. He cannot escape 
from the club except by retiring, and he cannot prevent the club from assigning his 
contract to any other club. 
Id. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also McCann, supra note 36. 
 138. Lea, supra note 135, at 23 n.19 (“[Flood] helped usher in a new era that allowed the players to 
exercise greater control of their careers and to share in the owners’ economic prosperity.” (quoting 
BRAD SNYDER, A WELL-PAID SLAVE 349 (2006) (alteration in original))). Also, Flood, “the talented 
centerfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals baseball team,” refused to be traded and chose to give up a 
couple of years of playing rather than be traded against his will. Id. at 23; Flood, 407 U.S. at 266; 
McCann, supra note 36. 
 139. McCann, supra note 36. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 205).  
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“athletes” are permitted to enter the United States on business visitor 
and athlete visas due to the parallels drawn to traditional sports.142 
The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
approved an athlete visa for an Esports competitor for the first time in 
2013, which expanded the category for nontraditional athletes.143 The 
USCIS has total discretion to determine what types of activities and 
competitors fall within the visa criteria because neither “sport” nor 
“athlete” is clearly defined.144 The USCIS has demonstrated a 
“willingness to expand the meaning of ‘athlete’” beyond traditional 
sports by weighing the components of fine-tune motor controls and 
mental dexterity rather than the physical conditions in traditional 
sports.145 In addition, over 117,000 signatures supported a petition 
urging that the term “athlete” includes Esports competitors in 
response to the denial of a Swedish competitor’s visa because Super 
Smash Brothers Melee was not considered a legitimate sport by the 
U.S. government.146 After the outcry, the USCIS changed its mind 
and approved the visa.147 
 
 142. Kline, supra note 132. The article highlights the following: 
P visa policy for athletes is somewhat fragmented and can be found in a number of 
sources including statutes, regulations, and the Foreign Affairs Manual. . . . And 
USCIS has demonstrated a willingness to expand the meaning of “athlete” beyond 
traditional sports, allowing individuals whose competitions involve mental dexterity 
(as opposed to physical) to be classified as athletes. The P-1A classification applies to 
individuals coming to the United States temporarily to perform as athletes at an 
internationally recognized level of performance, with provisions for both amateur and 
professional athletes. Petitions for an internationally recognized athlete must include 
documentation of at least two evidentiary criteria, and major esports athletes seem 
well-positioned to satisfy these criteria. Examples include evidence of having 
participated to a significant extent in international competition with a national team, 
or a written statement from a member of the sports media detailing how an applicant 
or team is internationally recognized. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 143. Id. (“The first competitive esports player to obtain a P-1 visa was Canadian Danny Shiptur, a 
well-known competitor of the game League of Legends, a multiplayer battle arena game. He was 
followed by Korean Kim Dong-hwan, known for his skilled play of StarCraft II, a science fiction 
strategy game.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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Unlike traditional sports, it remains unclear whether Esports 
professionals are employees or independent contractors.148 Neither 
legislation nor court decisions have given clear answers, and the 
Esports industry lacks a formal union that other traditional sports 
have to effectively advocate for players.149 The difference between 
the two is an important consideration in contracts for Esports 
professionals because employee status can provide many benefits, 
including collective bargaining rights.150 The major difference 
between being an employee and an independent contractor is that 
“[i]ndependent contractors are free from supervision, direction, and 
control in the performance of their duties” and work for 
themselves.151 The key question in analyzing the two is the suspected 
 
 148. Hunter A. Bayliss, Note, Not Just a Game: The Employment Status and Collective Bargaining 
Rights of Professional ESports Players, 22 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 359, 362 (2016). Esports 
has failed to unionize: 
Currently, players have not attempted to form a collective bargaining unit and the 
NLRB has not asserted jurisdiction over eSports. There is no guarantee that the LCS, 
after learning of the potential for a collective bargaining action, will not stop 
providing payment (in an attempt to eliminate the employee relationship) or dissolve 
altogether. However, by embracing the employee status of professional employees, 
the LCS can further legitimize itself as an actual sport. This, in turn, would likely 
bring more potential players into League of Legends (increasing the game’s 
profitability) while also bringing more viewers to LCS events. 
Id. at 408 (footnote omitted). 
 149. Ariel Sodomsky, Note, Models of Confusion: Strutting the Line Between Agent and Manager, 
Employee and Independent Contractor in the New York Modeling Industry, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 269, 273 (2014). Other industries have unions to protect their people: 
In addition to legislation, another idea is to create a union for models like those that 
exist in other areas of the entertainment industry, such as for actors and directors. By 
having an organization looking out for the models’ best interests, it would be much 
more difficult for agencies to take advantage of the models, and even if the agencies 
tried to take advantage, it would be much more difficult for the agencies to get away 
with it. A large issue within the industry is that models stay silent about indiscretions 
committed against them. A union is one way to make models feel more comfortable 
talking about these transgressions, as the models would know that they have an 
organization standing behind them and protecting them. 
Id. at 301 (footnote omitted). 
 150. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (granting employees the right to collectively bargain without restraint); 
Bayliss, supra note 148. See generally Nicholas C. Daly, Amateur Hour Is Over: Time for College 
Athletes to Clock In Under the FLSA, 37 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 471 (2021), for an excellent look into the 
importance of employee status in relation to college athletes.  
 151. Sodomsky, supra note 149, at 287 (alteration in original). 
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employer’s ability to control the supposed employee by looking at 
the manner and means by which the work is performed.152 
The language of the Gamer Agreement indicated that Tfue is an 
independent contractor for FaZe, but California law may recognize 
him as an employee.153 In hopes that California law will recognize 
him as an employee, Tfue views his relationship with FaZe as one 
between a “client artist and a talent agency.”154 Tfue is not the only 
one—many early contracts for Esports teams try to categorize the 
players as independent contractors, which is likely a 
misclassification.155 FaZe attempted to blur the lines of its 
relationship with Tfue by treating him like an employee while acting 
as his agent, putting behavioral standards on him, placing financial 
limitations on him, paying him a salary, and claiming exclusivity on 
sponsorships; the whole tangled web of problems further justifies 
voiding the Gamer Agreement.156 Despite the strong argument for 
classifying Esports professionals as employees rather than 
 
 152. Bayliss, supra note 148, at 386–87 (“Though evidence of economic control is not per se proof of 
the control necessary to show an employee-employer relationship, the economic realities of the parties 
must not be overlooked. . . . Further, control over manner and means of performance is also a difficult 
matter to determine.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Johnson v. VCG-IS, LLC, No. 30-2015-00802813, 
2019 WL 1245311, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2019); Tony Marks, The California Supreme Court Deals a 
Blow to Independent Contractors, FORBES (May 29, 2018, 8:16 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonymarks/2018/05/29/the-california-supreme-court-deals-a-blow-to-
independent-contractors/?sh=752eaafa70a1 [https://perma.cc/7YHF-B57T]. The Supreme Court of 
California adopted a new standard that presumes that workers qualify as employees instead of 
contractors: 
Under the newly adopted “ABC test,” a worker is an independent contractor to whom 
a wage order does not apply only if the hiring entity establishes all of the following: 
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in connection 
with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of 
such work and in fact; (B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual 
course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) that the worker is customarily engaged 
in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as 
the work performed for the hiring entity. 
Marks, supra. 
 153. McCann, supra note 36. 
 154. Id. 
 155. MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW § 24.13 (4th ed. 2020) (“Even under normal 
employment analysis, a contract that requires an esports athlete to live in a house with his/her 
teammates, practice full-time, and participate in competitions and travel to events at the whim of the 
team owner would constitute an employment agreement regardless of what it is labeled.”). 
 156. Thooorin, supra note 38. 
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independent contractors, the industry may have never expanded by 
starting with employees because, in the early days, it would not have 
been economically feasible to pay gamers an employee salary for one 
niche video game in the context of the entire Esports industry.157 
However, as a seasoned player, Tfue “is performing work within the 
usual course of FaZe Clan’s business” to support a classification of 
employee.158 
III. PROPOSAL 
Esports, once on the periphery of the gaming culture, has erupted 
in popularity in recent years and does not seem to be slowing down 
in the years to come.159 Following the traditional sports’ playbook, 
Esports events attract enormous audiences, comparable to top-tier 
sporting events by catering to a “desirable, content hungry youth[ful] 
demographic that advertisers find appealing.”160 Unfortunately, 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. McCann, supra note 36. But see FaZe Clan Inc. v. Tenney, 467 F. Supp. 3d 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 
2020) (“Tenny was not FaZe Clan’s employee.”). The court based its classification of Tfue as an 
independent contractor on the language of the Gamer Agreement itself. Id.  
 159. TROST ET AL., supra note 23 (“Major eSports events attract audiences that rival some of the 
world’s great[est] sporting events.”); SCOTT, supra note 155 (“While many are still struggling with the 
value of playing videogames, the industry is largely announcing that esports have ‘finally hit the 
mainstream . . . .’”); Megan Lovell, Esports Revenues to Reach $1B—Huge Opportunities for IT 
Vendors, Especially in Education, FUTURESOURCE CONSULTING (June 5, 2019), 
https://www.futuresource-consulting.com/insights/esports-revenues-to-reach-1b-huge-opportunities-for-
it-vendors-especially-in-education/?locale=en [https://perma.cc/5RNH-QCJS] (“Major competitions such 
as the Intel Extreme Masters already attract more than a hundred thousand spectators, and millions of fans 
follow esports broadcasts on streaming channels like Twitch. . . . [O]verall esports industry revenues are set to 
exceed $900 million this year, with an 18% 2019–2023 CAGR expected, driving revenues through the 
billion-dollar mark in 2020 and onto $1.8 billion by 2023.”); Smith, supra note 4 (“Esports have a growing, 
dedicated following . . . that is poised to surpass $1 billion this year, representing 
27% . . . year-over-year growth in valuation and more than double its sub-$500 million valuation in 
2016.”). 
 160. TROST ET AL., supra note 23; see also Steven T. Taylor, Young but Experienced: Attorney Brings 
Skills & Esports Knowledge to LA Firm, 36 OF COUNS.: LEGAL PRAC. & MGMT REP. 19, 22 (2017) 
(“It’s very interesting and fun for me to help individuals who are so passionate about the new frontier in 
sports and are not only redefining how to define athletes but redefining sports, how sports are consumed, 
how consumers interact with sports figures.” (emphasis added) (quoting Esports attorney Aaron 
Swerdlow)). In addition, Esports is already a $1 billion industry and soon will be a multibillion-dollar-a-
year industry. Taylor, supra, at 20; TROST ET AL., supra note 23 (“[Esports is a] rapidly growing form of 
entertainment, driven in part by the growing provenance of online gaming and online broadcasting 
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Esports remains widely fragmented in terms of industry-norm 
contracts, the utter lack of regulation of the industry, and most 
importantly, the ambiguous statutory scheme that fogs the 
classification of professional gamers as athletes, artists, or something 
anew.161 Therefore, California’s legislature or the U.S. Congress 
remain responsible for preventing the ethereal foundations of the 
Esports industry from collapsing and dissolving a new citadel of 
sport—professional gaming.162 By dismantling the pros from the 
cons of the TAA and MAA, legislatures can craft new 
Esports-specific legislation to account for this sui generis industry 
and allow it to function to its fullest potential. 
Half a century later, the Labor Commissioner repeatedly uses 
outdated reasoning from the first cases interpreting the TAA despite 
the evolving entertainment industry giving rise to new and exciting 
creative minds. The TAA and MAA give no clear answers as to 
whether professional gamers are professional athletes, artists, or 
something anew. In addition, neither legislation, executive orders, 
nor court decisions have paved a path to sound reasoning, which 
could cause this confusion to persist for decades. An influencer- or 
gamer-specific legislation could give definitive classification to these 
new, evolving roles in society.163 By looking at the dismantled pros 
of the TAA and the MAA, legislatures can effectively craft a law that 
makes sense for professional gamers, encompassed by the role of 
influencers in all industries. 
 
technologies. . . . [C]ommercial opportunity . . . has led to a significant influx of investment 
capital . . . .”). 
 161. Stark & Walkowiak, supra note 22 (“Perhaps no game—or more accurately collection of 
games—is harder to regulate than esports.”); Thooorin, supra note 38. 
 162. Stark & Walkowiak, supra note 22. 
 163. Sodomsky, supra note 149, at 297–98. An example of specific legislation: 
[T]he best solution may be to create model-specific legislation to govern the diverse 
and complex relationships within the modeling industry. . . . By having an 
organization looking out for the models’ best interests, it would be much more 
difficult for agencies to take advantage of the models, and even if the agencies tried 
to take advantage, it would be much more difficult for the agencies to get away with 
it. . . . While working to build numbers, the Model Alliance could also try to get more 
big name models to join them. 
Id. at 297–302. 
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Four decades ago, California’s legislature designed rules tailored 
to protect Hollywood talent from atrocious impulses in the 
entertainment and media industry.164 This harsh industry, where a 
single misstep can be punished, implores creative talent and their 
representatives to venture through a jungle of various employment 
and service opportunities.165 The TAA has been on the books since 
1978—with its roots entrenched in earlier Hollywood days—and is 
now at the front and center of heightened controversy between artists 
and agents.166 Although formulated in good faith to protect artists 
from capitalizing agents, the TAA’s current state benefits artists who 
use the Act as a tool to repudiate now undesirable contracts.167 
Legislatures and courts have grappled with the TAA’s harshness, 
and the legislature amended the TAA in 1982 with sunset 
provisions.168 Courts have also bowed down to the exclusive 
authority of the Labor Commissioner in analyzing these contracts and 
have avoided overruling any of the Commissioner’s decisions.169 
 
 164. David Ng, The Latest Wrinkle in the Writer-Agent War: A State Law Widely Seen As Outdated, 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-talent-
agencies-act-20190430-story.html [https://perma.cc/2TBF-G76X] (“Although the statute was initially 
intended to protect the weak, some experts say it now gives agents a captive client base, enthroning 
them in positions of impregnable power.”). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Keith Warren & Ryan Wechsler, “An Offer California Can’t Refuse”: How an Efficient and 
Adaptable Framework Can Improve Remedies Under the Talent Agency Act and Correct the Issues with 
Its Interpretation, 21 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 93 (2014). 
 168. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(c)–(d) (West 2013); Marathon Ent., Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 753 
(Cal. 2008); Warren & Wechsler, supra note 167, at 89 (“[T]he Legislature amended the TAA in 1982 
by imposing a one-year statute of limitations, eliminating criminal sanctions for violations, and 
establishing a ‘safe harbor’ for managers to procure employment when acting in conjunction with a 
licensed agent.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting LAB. § 1700.44(d))). 
 169. LAB. § 1700.44; Warren & Wechsler, supra note 167, at 94. The Labor Commissioner has 
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes that arise under the TAA. Id. The Labor Commissioner’s 
jurisdiction is limited by section 1700.45, which allows the parties to arbitrate the contract in limited 
circumstances. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.45 (West 2013); see also Marathon Ent., 174 P.3d at 753. The 
Supreme Court of California summarized: 
We recognize, however, that in more recent decisions, the Labor Commissioner has 
expressly adopted the position Blasi advocates: severance is never available to permit 
partial recovery of commissions for managerial services that required no talent 
agency license. . . . [T]he Labor Commissioner’s assessment of the legislative history 
and case law is mistaken . . . . We are thus unpersuaded and decline to follow the 
Labor Commissioner’s interpretation. 
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Thus, the Labor Commissioner maintains impregnable power to strip 
away earnings from agents.170 Contrary to the TAA’s original 
purpose, artists fail to “employ the TAA as a shield” to ensure the 
protections originally contemplated by the legislature and instead use 
the TAA as a sword to strike down contracts—hopelessly leaving 
agents to the mercy of artist-wielded swords.171 
This proposed legislation should change and adapt the statutory 
text in the TAA’s definition of “artist” to account for professional 
gamers and ultimately influencers by more appropriately defining 
“other entertainment enterprises.”172 This would avoid the problems 
the TAA is currently struggling with by revising outdated language. 
In light of the fierce war between artist and agent, scholars on both 
sides believe “the application . . . feels outdated.”173 Surely, the 
drafters of the TAA meant well in providing the catch-all provision 
in defining “artist”; but did they anticipate the booming industry of 
Esports in light of almost half-century-old technology?174 Decisions 
throughout the past half century appear bent on maintaining the 
TAA’s purpose when analyzing differing creative talent as artists or 
not.175 Historically, California’s Labor Commission has held that a 
 
Marathon Ent., 174 P.3d at 754 (citations omitted). 
 170. Warren & Wechsler, supra note 167, at 96. 
 171. Id. at 93–94, 96. 
 172. See supra Section II.A. 
 173. Ng, supra note 164 (“The laws were put in place to protect talent from being abused and taken 
advantage of . . . . It’s the application that feels outdated.” (emphasis added) (quoting New York 
entertainment attorney Jason Boyarski). 
 174. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West 2013). The statute provides: 
“Artists” means actors and actresses rendering services on the legitimate stage and in 
the production of motion pictures, radio artists, musical artists, musical organizations, 
directors of legitimate stage, motion picture and radio productions, musical directors, 
writers, cinematographers, composers, lyricists, arrangers, models, and other artists 
and persons rendering professional services in motion picture, theatrical, radio, 
television and other entertainment enterprises. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 175. Determination of Controversy at 6, Bluestein v. Prod. Arts Mgmt., TAC 24–98 (Cal. Lab. 
Comm’n Nov. 3, 1999). The Commission stated: 
Occasionally assisting in shot location or stepping in as a second director as described 
by petitioner, does not rise to the creative level required of an “artist” as intended by 
the drafters. Virtually all line producers or production managers engage in de minimis 
levels of creativity. There must be more than incidental creative input. The individual 
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person is an “artist” when the professional services are creative in 
nature; despite this open-ended formula, the Labor Commissioner 
limits this inquiry when the services are in connection with an 
entertainment enterprise.176 In American First Run v. OMNI 
Entertainment Group, the Labor Commissioner did not believe the 
legislature intended for such a “radically far-reaching result” and thus 
imposed this limitation.177 Therefore, conflicting views enshroud the 
TAA’s definition of “artist” in a heavy veil of fog most likely not 
applicable to professional gamers. 
Further, license requirements should be removed to eliminate the 
ambiguity in procuring employment for professional gamers by a 
manager, agent, or someone on similar footing—this distinguishes 
the chilling effect on lawyers who do not have an agency license. 
Many agents feel the TAA is overly vague in different statutory 
sections in defining various moving parts and players in the 
entertainment industry.178 Specifically, the TAA’s definition of 
“procurement” remains unclear and leaves agents, at best, to guess 
what activities are determined to be procurement.179 
This ambiguity has long haunted entertainers’ agents, especially 
with the possible hard-hitting penalties for violating the TAA, with 
 
to the production to be afforded the protection of the Act. We do not feel budget 
management falls within these parameters. 
Id.; see also Warren & Wechsler, supra note 167, at 107. 
 176. Determination of Controversy at 4, Patchett v. DLM LA, Inc., TAC 47367 (Cal. Lab. Comm’n 
Oct. 18, 2018). 
 177. Order Dismissing Petition to Determine Controversy at 5, Am. First Run v. OMNI Ent. Grp., 
TAC 32–95 (Cal. Lab. Comm’n Apr. 8, 1996) (cleaned up); Determination of Controversy, supra note 
176, at 4 (“Without such a limitation, virtually every ‘person rendering professional services’ connected 
with an entertainment project . . . would fall within the definition of ‘artists.’”). 
 178. Richard Busch, Walking on the California Talent Agency Act’s Thin Ice: Personal Managers 
Beware!, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2013, 11:19 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardbusch/2013/03/25/walking-on-the-california-talent-agency-acts-
thin-ice-personal-managers-beware/#101dc3f7609f [https://perma.cc/9K7D-6UMP]. 
 179. Marathon Ent., Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 750 (Cal. 2008). The Supreme Court of California 
has noted: 
We note we are not called on to decide, and do not decide, what precisely constitutes 
“procurement” . . . . The Act contains no definition, and the Labor Commissioner has 
struggled over time to better delineate which actions involve mere general assistance 
to an artist’s career and which stray across the line to illicit procurement. 
Id. 
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even a minor infraction resulting in losses of past and future earnings 
and cancellation of the contract.180 The confusion may result in a 
chilling effect on the work of agents, deterring them from doing 
customary work for their artists due to the fear of severe 
consequences.181 Scholars estimate that the California Labor 
Commission has canceled over $250 million in personal management 
commissions for such violations, and the Waisbren court seems to 
support this finding: “the most effective weapon for assuring 
compliance with the Act is the power . . . to . . . declare any contract 
entered into between the parties void from the inception.”182 
Removing the license requirement in the new statute would help 
everyone involved in the industry by removing the possibilities of 
severe sanctions and fines. 
Unlike the trend of the Labor Commissioner and previous 
decisions, the burden of production should also be shifted to the 
professional gamer or influencer who challenges the contract. In past 
decisions, the burden of proof seemed to be placed on the agent, with 
the artist contesting the contract receiving a favorable attitude from 
the Labor Commissioner. “Under federal evidence law and the 
common law of contracts, the party attempting to void a contract 
generally bears the burden of showing the court that the contract 
should indeed be voided.”183 Further, every affirmative defense to a 
contract’s enforceability places the burden on the challenging 
party.184 In addition, when viewing the contract, the Labor 
 
 180. See, e.g., Chiba v. Greenwald, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 86, 90, 92 (Ct. App. 2007); Yoo v. Robi, 24 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 740, 751 (Ct. App. 2005); Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1465, 1465 (1999); Waisbren v. 
Peppercorn Prods., Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 438–40 (Ct. App. 1995); Busch, supra note 178. 
 181. See generally Busch, supra note 178. 
 182. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446–47 (quoting CAL. ENT. COMM’N, REPORT TO LEGISLATURE 
AND GOVERNOR ON THE TALENT AGENCIES ACT 17 (1985)); see also Busch, supra note 178. 
 183. Warren & Wechsler, supra note 167, at 107. 
 184. Id. at 107 n.187. Examples of affirmative defenses include: 
For example, the party asserting the affirmative defense of impossibility bears the 
burden of proving a real impossibility and not a mere inconvenience or unexpected 
difficulty. . . . Further, the burden of proof for the affirmative defense of 
unconscionability is on the party claiming the contract is unconscionable. . . . In terms 
of the affirmative defense of fraud, courts have held a fundamental essential to a valid 
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Commissioner should determine the main purpose of the contract. If 
the main purpose of the contract is not to engage in illegal 
procurement, the Labor Commissioner should, in light of the 
Marathon decision, use the doctrine of severability to prevent unjust 
enrichment.185 These new requirements for the piece of legislation 
would greatly alleviate the strain between agents and professional 
gamers, and “contracts under this suggestion would be less likely to 
be voided in their entirety.”186 
On the MAA front, the harsh criminal penalties should be 
eliminated in the new legislation to avoid deterring agents from 
procuring deals for professional gamers. The new legislation should 
also account for a definition of “athlete” that the MAA so heedlessly 
ignored. This would rectify the disastrous problems the MAA created 
initially when it replaced prior law and repealed several sections of 
California’s Labor Code.187 Under prior law, the Labor 
Commissioner played an important role similar to the one it played 
under the TAA; the provision required athlete agents to register with 
the Labor Commissioner.188 Unlike the TAA, the MAA imposes an 
enhanced and harsh system of not only civil liability but also criminal 
liability for slight violations of the statute.189 Further, these harsh 
 
misrepresentation. . . . The burden was on the defendant to prove that 
element. . . . Duress and undue influence are affirmative defenses which may 
invalidate a contract, and the defendant bears the burden of proof to establish them. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 185. Marathon Ent., Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 754 (Cal. 2008) (“In deciding whether severance is 
available, we have explained ‘[t]he overarching inquiry is whether “the interests of justice . . . would be 
furthered” by severance.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare 
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 696 (Cal. 2000))). The court went further in explaining the interests of justice: 
Courts are to look to the various purposes of the contract. If the central purpose of the 
contract is tainted with illegality, then the contract as a whole cannot be enforced. If 
the illegality is collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and the illegal provision 
can be extirpated from the contract by means of severance or restriction, then such 
severance and restriction are appropriate. 
Id. (quoting Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 696). 
 186. Warren & Wechsler, supra note 167, at 110. 
 187. Baker, supra note 41. 
 188. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1510 (repealed 1996). 
 189. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18897.8 (West 2017). The statute provides: 
Any professional athlete, or any student athlete, or any elementary or secondary 
school, college, university, or other educational institution, or any league, conference, 
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penalties include a minimum $50,000 civil penalty or misdemeanor 
carrying up to a year in county jail.190 Additionally, the prevailing 
party may recover punitive damages, court costs, and reasonable 
attorneys’ fees.191 Despite these harsh penalties, there is no doubt in 
passing the MAA that the California legislature acted in good faith to 
protect athletes, and new legislation should follow in its good-faith 
footsteps when eliminating these harsh criminal penalties.192 
This amendment or new legislation should also relinquish its death 
grip on the practice of law for attorneys in California. The benefit of 
this piece of legislation would be to encourage attorneys to become 
influencer agents without worrying about grueling statutory 
requirements like licenses. In doing so, the new legislation would 
avoid problems seen in the MAA. Incidental to any good-faith effort 
shown by the legislature, the MAA brought under its ambit rules 
governing the practice of law in California.193 The MAA required 
any licensed agent to post either an insurance policy or $100,000 in 
collateral that cuts in favor of securing judgments by athletes versus 
agents.194 Why should attorneys post any collateral to practice law? 
The entry fee of $100,000 of liquid net worth is unnecessary and was 
 
association, or federation of the preceding educational institutions, or any other 
person may bring a civil action for recovery of damages from an athlete agent, if that 
professional athlete, that student athlete, that institution, any member of that league, 
conference, association, or federation, or that other person is adversely affected by the 
acts of the athlete agent or of the athlete agent’s representative or employee in 
violation of this chapter. 
Id.; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18897.93(a) (West 2017). The statute also provides: 
An athlete agent or athlete agent’s representative or employee who violates any 
provision of this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine 
of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), or imprisonment in a county jail 
not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. 
BUS. & PROF. § 18897.93(a); Baker, supra note 41. 
 190. BUS. & PROF. § 18897.93(a). 
 191. BUS. & PROF. § 18897.8(b) (“A plaintiff that prevails in a civil action brought under this section 
may recover actual damages, or fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), whichever is higher; punitive damages; 
court costs; and reasonable attorney’s fees.”). 
 192. Baker, supra note 41, at 278. 
 193. Id. 
 194. BUS. & PROF. § 18897.87(a) (“A policy or policies of insurance against liability imposed on or 
against the agent by law for damages arising out of claims in an amount for each claim of at least one 
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).”); Baker, supra note 41. 
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put in place by a special interest that has resulted in a chilling effect, 
discouraging attorneys from becoming athlete agents and entrusting 
the field to “less scrupulous, unlicensed persons.”195 
In addition, the new legislation needs to provide a thorough 
definition of “athlete” to help guide courts in determining if an 
influencer is an athlete, artist, or a combination thereof. This would 
benefit both sides of influencer contracts and eliminate ambiguity in 
determining what type of conflicting law applies by establishing a 
benchmark definition to refer to when analyzing influencer contracts. 
This would also avoid ambiguities evident in the MAA. Most 
troublesome, the MAA fails to define what an “athlete” is.196 Further, 
California failed to adopt the UAAA and relies on a “draconian 
system of regulating and penalizing” athlete agents.197 California and 
the MAA have sanctioned the complicated and unsettled area of 
defining, classifying, regulating, and penalizing athletes, their agents, 
and the relationship between the athletes and their agents.198 
Overall, after redefining “artist” and finally defining “athlete,” the 
legislation should account for a combination of characteristics and 
traits that allude to both an artist and an athlete to account for 
professional gamers’ unique, creative content making, and to allow 
for a flexible framework for future creative content makers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Esports industry is experiencing rapid growth, and it is 
certainly an exciting and pivotal time to be involved in the Esports 
market.199 California law is ill-fitted to the Esports industry and gives 
 
 195. Baker, supra note 41, at 279. 
 196. See supra Section I.B. 
 197. Baker, supra note 41, at 299; Smith, supra note 43. 
 198. Deubert, supra note 103, at 4. 
 199. Kyle Kenny, How Visa Issues Combined with Recent Franchising Agreements Effect Current 
Esports Players and the Future Landscape of Esports, PENN. ST. U. J.L. & INT’L AFFS.: BLOG (Oct. 30, 
2018), https://sites.psu.edu/jlia/1256-2/ [https://perma.cc/7338-2CFW] (“At its current growth rate, the 
esports industry is poised to rival, if not surpass traditional sports in viewership and player rate.”); Jay 
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no clear answers in classifying professional gamers as athletes, 
artists, or something else. Video games and the Esports industry have 
been misunderstood for a long period of time, and now those 
unfamiliar with the industry are uncertain of how old laws govern the 
skyrocketing industry. Is Esports a sport, or is it some sort of 
entertainment activity, like going to the movies? 
It is up to California’s legislature or the U.S. Congress to enact 
new, unique legislation to put an end to this debate. By enacting new 
influencer- or gamer-specific legislation, professional gamers and 
agents can better understand their relationship and enjoy the 
protections afforded to other creative minds in the entertainment 
industry. The combination of factors from the TAA and the MAA 
asserted in this Note provides a worthy framework in drafting new 
legislation without frustrating the overall purpose of the two acts. 
Overall, California’s legislature must assert its authority and voice to 
implement new legislation for a unique, complex industry to allow it 
to function to its fullest potential. After all, Esports participants are 
far from the “perpetuated stereotype of video games being played by 
overweight teenagers huddled in dark basements”—they account for 
the global revenue of Esports’ predicted value of $1.1 billion in 2020, 
up 26% from 2018.200 It is time they start being treated as a valuable 




 200. See Holden et al., supra note 7. 
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